And Joschka Fischer too

Joschka Fischer's also grooving on the motions of this contemporary mood when, in Tehran, he puts it just so:

From the perspective of the West, the stakes in the nuclear dispute with Iran are very high. A rejection of the current offer will lead to an escalation of the conflict, as the decision in July 2006 of the UN Security Council clearly demonstrates. There is a unified position, held not only by Europe and the United States, but also within the Security Council and by the international community, that the risk of a breakthrough to nuclear weapons by Iran is unacceptable. We had a bitter split within the international community about the question of whether to wage war against Iraq. But Iran’s nuclear ambitions have unified the international community completely.

Let me explain to you our strategic analysis of a possible military nuclearization of Iran. In our assessment, your regional neighbors will not sit on the sidelines and applaud this step, but will also go nuclear. An anti-hegemonial coalition would be the immediate result. But then there would be a nuclear arms race throughout the Middle East, including Turkey, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. This would be a nightmare in this very unstable and dangerous region, and I seriously doubt that such an additional destabilization of the region would be in the well-considered security interests of the Islamic Republic of Iran. And the very negative consequences of a nuclear arms race in the Middle East on the level of terrorist and asymmetric threats should also not be underestimated. An openly declared nuclear arms race would therefore change the symmetric and asymmetric balance of power completely, and some of the regional powers, not only Israel, would see such a development as an existential threat.

From a European perspective, such a nuclear arms race in the Middle East, geopolitically speaking our neighbor region, would change our strategic security posture dramatically and force us into a new policy of effective deterrence.

The interests of the other major global players—Russia, China, and India—shouldn’t be misinterpreted. The vital interests of these powers would also be undermined by such a development. Allow me to predict that even in the event of a possible crisis between the Security Council and Iran, the unity of the council would survive.

And allow me to bring another aspect of a possible crisis between Iran and the Security Council to your attention. If there were to be a confrontation between the Security Council and Iran—and may God help us to prevent this from happening—the very future of the multilateral system and of the UN would be at stake. If the Security Council would not be able to solve this conflict, it would have a very negative effect on the whole international institutional framework and indeed threaten the functionality of the multilateral system. I cannot believe that the G77 and even the members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference would accept such a development, because it would infringe upon their basic interests.

We are at a crossroad, and the leadership of Iran must take a decision, perhaps one of historic proportions. Cooperation or confrontation are the alternatives, and, please, don’t blame the messenger for the message.

Again, the garden of forking paths. Again?